Publications
Conference Articles
2025
- On Deniable Authentication against Malicious VerifiersRune Fiedler and Roman LangrehrIn Crypto 2025 (to appear), Aug 2025
Deniable authentication allows Alice to authenticate a message to Bob, while retaining deniability towards third parties. In particular, not even Bob can convince a third party that Alice authenticated that message. Clearly, in this setting Bob should not be considered trustworthy. Furthermore, deniable authentication is necessary for deniable key exchange, as explicitly desired by Signal and off-the-record (OTR) messaging.
In this work we focus on (publicly verifiable) designated verifier signatures (DVS), which are a widely used primitive to achieve deniable authentication. We propose a definition of deniability against malicious verifiers for DVS. We give a construction that achieves this notion in the random oracle (RO) model. Moreover, we show that our notion is not achievable in the standard model with a concrete attack; thereby giving a non-contrived example of the RO heuristic failing.
All previous protocols that claim to achieve deniable authentication against malicious verifiers (like Signal’s initial handshake protocols X3DH and PQXDH) rely on the Extended Knowledge of Diffie–Hellman (EKDH) assumption. We show that this assumption is broken and that these protocols do not achieve deniability against malicious verifiers.EPRINT:FieLan25 - Non-interactive Key Exchange: New Notions, New Constructions, and Forward SecuritySuvradip Chakraborty, Dennis Hofheinz, and Roman LangrehrIn PKC 2025, Part II, May 2025
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a simple and elegant cryptographic primitive that allows two or more users to agree on a secret shared key without any interaction. NIKE schemes have been formalized in different scenarios (such as the public-key, or the identity-based setting), and have found many applications in cryptography.
In this work, we propose a NIKE variant that generalizes public-key and identity-based NIKE: a multi-authority identity-based NIKE (MA-ID-NIKE) is defined like an identity-based NIKE, only with several identity domains (i.e., several instances of an identity-based NIKE), and such that users from different identity domains can compute shared keys. This makes MA-ID-NIKE schemes more versatile than existing NIKE or identity-based NIKE schemes, for instance, in an application in which users from different (centrally managed) companies need to compute shared keys.
We show several results for MA-ID-NIKE schemes:
- We show that MA-ID-NIKE schemes generically imply public-key NIKEs, identity-based NIKEs, as well as forward-secure NIKE schemes, the latter of which are notoriously hard to construct.
- We propose two simple constructions of MA-ID-NIKE schemes from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and multilinear maps, respectively. These constructions achieve only selective security, but can be leveraged to adaptive security for small groups of users (that want to be able to agree on a joint shared key) in the random oracle model.
- We give a simple and elegant construction of MA-ID-NIKEs from identity-based encryption (IBE) and universal samplers. This construction achieves adaptive security also for large groups of users based on the adaptive security of the used universal samplers. Universal samplers, in turn, are known to be achievable using iO in the random oracle model. As a nice feature, the same construction yields hierarchical MA-ID-NIKEs or public-key NIKEs when instantiated with hierarchical IBE or public-key encryption instead of IBE schemes.
While these results are clearly only feasibility results, they do demonstrate the achievability of a concept that itself has very practical use cases.PKC:ChaHofLan25 - Malleable SNARKs and Their ApplicationsSuvradip Chakraborty, Dennis Hofheinz, Roman Langrehr, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Christoph Striecks, and Daniele VenturiIn EUROCRYPT 2025, Part IV, May 2025
Succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) are variants of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) in which complex statements can be proven in a compact way. SNARKs have had tremendous impact in several areas of cryptography, including verifiable computing, blockchains, and anonymous communication. A recurring concept in many applications is the concept of recursive SNARKs, in which a proof references a previous proof to show an evolved statement.
In this work, we investigate malleable SNARKs, a generalization of this concept of recursion. An adaptation of the existing concept of malleable NIZKs, malleable SNARKs allow to modify SNARK proofs to show related statements, but such that such mauled proofs are indistinguishable from “properly generated” fresh proofs of the related statement. We show how to instantiate malleable SNARKs for universal languages and relations, and give a number of applications: the first post-quantum RCCA-secure rerandomizable and updatable encryption schemes, a generic construction of reverse firewalls, and an unlinkable (i.e., computation-hiding) targeted malleable homomorphic encryption scheme.
Technically, our malleable SNARK construction relies on recursive proofs, but with a twist: in order to support the strong indistinguishability properties of mauled and fresh SNARK proofs, we need to allow an unbounded recursion depth. To still allow for a reasonable notion of extractability in this setting (and in particular to guarantee that extraction eventually finishes with a “proper” witness that does not refer to a previous SNARK proof), we rely on a new and generic computational primitive called adversarial one-way function (AOWF) that may be of independent interest. We give an AOWF candidate and prove it secure in the random oracle model.EC:CHLNSV25
2024
- On the Black-Box Complexity of Private-Key Inner-Product Functional EncryptionMohammad Hajiabadi, Roman Langrehr, Adam O’Neill, and Mingyuan WangIn TCC 2024, Part III, Dec 2024
We initiate the study of the black-box complexity of private-key functional encryption (FE). Of central importance in the private-key setting is the inner-product functionality, which is currently only known from assumptions that imply public-key encryption, such as Decisional Diffie-Hellman or Learning-with-Errors. As our main result, we rule out black-box constructions of private-key inner-product FE from random oracles. This implies a black-box separation between private-key inner-product FE from all symmetric-key primitives implied by random oracles (e.g., symmetric-key encryption and collision-resistant hash functions).
Proving lower bounds for private-key functional encryption schemes introduces challenges that were absent in prior works. In particular, the combinatorial techniques developed by prior works for proving black-box lower bounds are only useful in the public-key setting and predicate encryption settings, which all fail for the private-key FE case. Our work develops novel combinatorial techniques based on Fourier analysis to overcome these barriers. We expect these techniques to be widely useful in future research in this area.TCC:HLOW24 - On Structure-Preserving Cryptography and LatticesDennis Hofheinz, Kristina Hostáková, Roman Langrehr, and Bogdan UrsuIn PKC 2024, Part II, Apr 2024
The Groth-Sahai proof system is a highly efficient pairing-based proof system for a specific class of group-based languages. Cryptographic primitives that are compatible with these languages (such that we can express, e.g., that a ciphertext contains a valid signature for a given message) are called “structure-preserving”. The combination of structure-preserving primitives with Groth-Sahai proofs allows to prove complex statements that involve encryptions and signatures, and has proved useful in a variety of applications. However, so far, the concept of structure-preserving cryptography has been confined to the pairing setting.
In this work, we propose the first framework for structure-preserving cryptography in the lattice setting. Concretely, we
- define “structure-preserving sets” as an abstraction of (typically noisy) lattice-based languages,
- formalize a notion of generalized structure-preserving encryption and signature schemes (capturing a number of existing lattice-based encryption and signature schemes),
- construct a compatible zero-knowledge argument system that allows to argue about lattice-based structure-preserving primitives,
- offer a lattice-based construction of verifiably encrypted signatures in our framework.
Along the way, we also discover a new and efficient strongly secure lattice-based signature scheme. This scheme combines Rückert’s lattice-based signature scheme with the lattice delegation strategy of Agrawal et al., which yields more compact and efficient signatures.
We hope that our framework provides a first step towards a modular and versatile treatment of cryptographic primitives in the lattice setting.PKC:HHLU24
2023
- On the Multi-user Security of LWE-Based NIKERoman LangrehrIn TCC 2023, Part IV, Nov 2023
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) schemes like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange are a widespread building block in several cryptographic protocols. Since the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is not post-quantum secure, it is important to investigate post-quantum alternatives.
We analyze the security of the LWE-based NIKE by Ding et al. (ePrint 2012) and Peikert (PQCrypt 2014) in a multi-user setting where the same public key is used to generate shared keys with multiple other users. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange achieves this security notion. The mentioned LWE-based NIKE scheme comes with an inherent correctness error (Guo et al., PKC 2020), and this has significant implications for the multi-user security, necessitating a closer examination.
Single-user security generically implies multi-user security when all users generate their keys honestly for NIKE schemes with negligible correctness error. However, the LWE-based NIKE requires a super-polynomial modulus to achieve a negligible correctness error, which makes the scheme less efficient. We show that
- generically, single-user security does not imply multi-user security when the correctness error is non-negligible, but despite this
- the LWE-based NIKE with polynomial modulus is multi-user secure for honest users when the number of users is fixed in advance. This result takes advantage of the leakage-resilience properties of LWE.
We then turn to a stronger model of multi-user security that allows adversarially generated public keys. For this model, we consider a variant of the LWE-based NIKE where each public key is equipped with a NIZKPoK of the secret key. Adding NIZKPoKs is a standard technique for this stronger model and Hesse et al. (Crypto 2018) showed that this is sufficient to achieve security in the stronger multi-user security model for perfectly correct NIKEs (which the LWE-based NIKE is not). We show that
- for certain parameters that include all parameters with polynomial modulus, the LWE-based NIKE can be efficiently attacked with adversarially generated public keys, despite the use of NIZKPoKs, but
- for suitable parameters (that require a super-polynomial modulus), this security notion is achieved by the LWE-based NIKE with NIZKPoKs.
This stronger security notion has been previously achieved for LWE-based NIKE only in the QROM, while all our results are in the standard model.TCC:Langrehr23
2021
- Towards Tight Adaptive Security of Non-interactive Key ExchangeJulia Hesse, Dennis Hofheinz, Lisa Kohl, and Roman LangrehrIn TCC 2021, Part III, Nov 2021
We investigate the quality of security reductions for non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) schemes. Unlike for many other cryptographic building blocks (like public-key encryption, signatures, or zero-knowledge proofs), all known NIKE security reductions to date are non-tight, i.e., lose a factor of at least the number of users in the system. In that sense, NIKE forms a particularly elusive target for tight security reductions.
The main technical obstacle in achieving tightly secure NIKE schemes are adaptive corruptions. Hence, in this work, we explore security notions and schemes that lie between selective security and fully adaptive security. Concretely:
- We exhibit a tradeoff between key size and reduction loss. We show that a tighter reduction can be bought by larger public and secret NIKE keys. Concretely, we present a simple NIKE scheme with a reduction loss of O(N^2 log(ν)/ν^2), and public and secret keys of O(ν) group elements, where N denotes the overall number of users in the system, and νis a freely adjustable scheme parameter.
Our scheme achieves full adaptive security even against multiple “test queries” (i.e., adversarial challenges), but requires keys of size O(N) to achieve (almost) tight security under the matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption. Still, already this simple scheme circumvents existing lower bounds.
- We show that this tradeoff is inherent. We contrast the security of our simple scheme with a lower bound for all NIKE schemes in which shared keys can be expressed as an “inner product in the exponent”. This result covers the original Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme, as well as a large class of its variants, and in particular our simple scheme. Our lower bound gives a tradeoff between the “dimension” of any such scheme (which directly corresponds to key sizes in existing schemes), and the reduction quality. For ν= O(N), this shows our simple scheme and reduction optimal (up to a logarithmic factor).
- We exhibit a tradeoff between security and key size for tight reductions. We show that it is possible to circumvent the inherent tradeoff above by relaxing the desired security notion. Concretely, we consider the natural notion of semi-adaptive security, where the adversary has to commit to a single test query after seeing all public keys. As a feasibility result, we bring forward the first scheme that enjoys compact public keys and tight semi-adaptive security under the conjunction of the matrix Diffie-Hellman and learning with errors assumptions.
We believe that our results shed a new light on the role of adaptivity in NIKE security, and also illustrate the special role of NIKE when it comes to tight security reductions.TCC:HHKL21
2020
- Unbounded HIBE with Tight SecurityRoman Langrehr and Jiaxin PanIn ASIACRYPT 2020, Part II, Dec 2020
We propose the first tightly secure and unbounded hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based on standard assumptions. Our main technical contribution is a novel proof strategy that allows us to tightly randomize user secret keys for identities with arbitrary hierarchy depths using low entropy hidden in a small and hierarchy-independent master public key.
The notion of unbounded HIBE is proposed by Lewko and Waters (Eurocrypt 2011). In contrast to most HIBE schemes, an unbounded scheme does not require any maximum depth to be specified in the setup phase, and user secret keys or ciphertexts can be generated for identities of arbitrary depths with hierarchy-independent system parameters.
While all the previous unbounded HIBE schemes have security loss that grows at least linearly in the number of user secret key queries, the security loss of our scheme is only dependent on the security parameter, even in the multi-challenge setting, where an adversary can ask for multiple challenge ciphertexts. We prove the adaptive security of our scheme based on the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in prime-order pairing groups, which generalizes a family of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as k-Linear.AC:LanPan20 - Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption with Tight Multi-challenge SecurityRoman Langrehr and Jiaxin PanIn PKC 2020, Part I, May 2020
We construct the first hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme with tight adaptive security in the multi-challenge setting, where adversaries are allowed to ask for ciphertexts for multiple adaptively chosen identities. Technically, we develop a novel technique that can tightly introduce randomness into user secret keys for hierarchical identities in the multi-challenge setting, which cannot be easily achieved by the existing techniques for tightly multi-challenge secure IBE.
In contrast to the previous constructions, the security of our scheme is independent of the number of user secret key queries and that of challenge ciphertext queries. We prove the tight security of our scheme based on the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption, which is an abstraction of standard and simple decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions, such as the k-Linear and SXDH assumptions.
Finally, we also extend our ideas to achieve tight chosen-ciphertext security and anonymity, respectively. These security notions for HIBE have not been tightly achieved in the multi-challenge setting before.PKC:LanPan20
2019
- Tightly Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based EncryptionRoman Langrehr and Jiaxin PanIn PKC 2019, Part I, Apr 2019
We construct the first tightly secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based on standard assumptions, which solves an open problem from Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (CRYPTO 2014). At the core of our constructions is a novel randomization technique that enables us to randomize user secret keys for identities with flexible length.
The security reductions of previous HIBEs lose at least a factor of Q, which is the number of user secret key queries. Different to that, the security loss of our schemes is only dependent on the security parameter. Our schemes are adaptively secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a generalization of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as k-Linear. We have two tightly secure constructions, one with constant ciphertext size, and the other with tighter security at the cost of linear ciphertext size. Among other things, our schemes imply the first tightly secure identity-based signature scheme by a variant of the Naor transformation.PKC:LanPan19
Journal Articles
2020
- Tightly Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based EncryptionRoman Langrehr and Jiaxin PanJournal of Cryptology, Oct 2020
We construct the first tightly secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based on standard assumptions, which solves an open problem from Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (CRYPTO 2014). At the core of our constructions is a novel randomization technique that enables us to randomize user secret keys for identities with flexible length.
The security reductions of previous HIBEs lose at least a factor of Q, which is the number of user secret key queries. Different to that, the security loss of our schemes is only dependent on the security parameter. Our schemes are adaptively secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a generalization of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as k-Linear. We have two tightly secure constructions, one with constant ciphertext size, and the other with tighter security at the cost of linear ciphertext size. Among other things, our schemes imply the first tightly secure identity-based signature scheme by a variant of the Naor transformation.JC:LanPan20
Preprints
2024
- Access-Controlled Inner Product Function-Revealing EncryptionOjaswi Acharya, Weiqi Feng, Roman Langrehr, and Adam O’NeillNov 2024
We extend the concept of access control for functional encryption, introduced by Abdalla et al. (ASIACRYPT 2020), to function-revealing encryption (Joy and Passelègue, SCN 2018). Here “access control” means that function evaluation is only possible when a specified access policy is met. Specifically, we introduce access-controlled inner product function-revealing encryption (AC-IPFRE) and give two applications.
On the theoretical side, we use AC-IPFRE to show that function-hiding inner-product functional encryption (FH-IPFE), introduced by Bishop et al. (ASIACRYPT 2015), is equivalent to IPFRE. To show this, we in particular generically construct AC-IPFRE from IPFRE for the “non-zero inner-product” (NZIP) access policy. This result uses an effective version of Lagrange’s Four Square Theorem. One consequence of this result is that lower bounds by Ünal (EUROCRYPT 2020) suggest that, as for FH-IPFE, bilinear pairings will be needed to build IPFRE.
On the practical side, we build an outsourced approximate nearest-neighbor (ANN) search protocol and mitigate its leakage via AC-IPFRE. For this, we construct a practical AC-IPFRE scheme in the generic bilinear group model for a specific access policy for ANN search. To this end, we show that techniques of Wee (TCC 2020) implicitly give the most practical FH-IPFE scheme to date. We implement the resulting outsourced ANN search protocol and report on its performance.
Of independent interest, we show AC-IPFRE for NZIP implies attribute-hiding small-universe AC-IPFRE for arbitrary access policies. Previous work on access control for FE did not achieve attribute hiding. Overall, our results demonstrate that AC-IPFRE is of both theoretical and practical interest and set the stage for future work in the area.EPRINT:AFLO24